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This paper reviews the arguments in favour and against the “Sta-
bility and Growth Pact” signed by the countries of the Euro area. We
find the theoretical debate to be inconclusive, as both externality and
credibility arguments can be reversed to yield opposite, and equally
plausible conclusions. We therefore suggest the view that the stability
pact is a social norm, and that adherence to that norm responds in
fact to the need to preserve reputation in front of the other members
of the European Union. Using this extreme but not implausible hy-
pothesis, we build a simple model similar in spirit to Akerlof’s (1980)
seminal paper on social norms, and we show that reputational issues
may cause the emergence of a stable and inferior equilibrium.
We further show that, when with the enlargement a number of
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1 Introduction
In this paper we extend to public behaviour the framework introduced by
Akerlof’s (1980) seminal contribution on social norms.1 In Akerlof, freely
obeyed social norms may result in constraints on private behaviour and in
departures from the ‘normal’ equilibrium. Similarly, we argue that they may
also limit the room of manoeuvre of national governments interacting to build
an Economic and Monetary Union. The ‘public’ social norm we focus on here
is the Stability and Growth Pact signed by the countries participating in the
EMU in 1997.
Whether of public or private origin, a social norm does not generally
follow sound economic reasoning, but rather is grounded in other motivations.
What matters for its design is a consideration of reputation rather than
its direct consequences for any measure of (private or social) welfare. As
Akerlof (1980, p. 753) writes, “people want to become rich and famous, and
famous not being redundant”. There is a major diﬀerence with our approach
though. Most private social customs have their origin in a notion of fair
behaviour, implying that private agents behave in such a way as to refrain
from taking full advantage of a (temporary) dominant position (e.g., Hicks,
1974). Thus, norms are a normal outcome of social interaction. Norms
constraining public behaviour, however, have their origin in some doctrine,
representing the current economic paradigm, regardless of its short term
economic consequences. In other words, private-social customs are grounded
in rules of fair behaviour, whereas public-social customs are supposed to be
consistent with dominant economic doctrine.
Does the Stability and Growth Pact have some features of a social custom
constraining governments to build or maintain their reputation? And if this
is the case, what are the consequences for the welfare of Europe citizens?
These questions arise because it is diﬃcult to be convinced by the ratio-
nale underlying the Pact. Even if the theoretical debate were not inconclusive
(as in fact it is, as we argue in section 3), its application would not lead to
clear-cut figures about the maximum tolerable deficit : ‘Normal’ deficits are
not independent of the output gap, and it does not need more than a mod-
icum of historical sensitivity to understand that we should not have blind
confidence in the figures of potential growth and output gap (Solow, 2002).
Furthermore, the provision by which the budgetary position of each country
should be in the medium run close to balance or in surplus seems to have
even weaker theoretical foundations. It implies the strong consequence that
1Hechter and Opp (2001) provide a thorough survey of models of social norms in
economics and game theory, as well as in other fields.
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public debt as a ratio to GDP should trend asymptotically to zero, a posi-
tion hard to justify per se. Finally, not distinguishing between current and
capital expenditures, the Stability Pact may lead to odd evaluations of the
stance of fiscal policy. Two countries with the same deficit may be equally
reprimanded by the European Commission whatever the origin of the deficit,
be it, the building of a high speed train or the increase of public salaries.
Besides the assertion that lower deficits and debts are better, other argu-
ments in favour of the Stability Pact are expressed in terms of externalities
and credibility. In a monetary union, the fiscal policy of one country aﬀects
the interest rates and level of activity of others countries in the union. We
argue, however, that it does not follow that such externalities should lead to
a well defined rule constraining the behaviour of national governments, and
that it is far from obvious that such a rule should lean toward the restrictive
side.
So why have governments accepted restriction on their behavior, when
the economic theory behind these restrictions are, in fact, inconclusive? The
question is all the more important because national governments in the union
have fewer instruments left, having already given up monetary sovereignty,
i.e. the manipulation of the exchange rate and the short term rate of interest.
A common monetary policy has diﬀerentiated eﬀects on the dynamics of
public debt: countries ‘enjoying’ the lowest rate of inflation will suﬀer from
the highest level of real interest rate; it is particularly diﬃcult to understand
the rationale of the policy mix which will be imposed by a strict obedience
to the Stability Pact.
Consideration of reputation may go a long way to solve this puzzle; and
this argument may not be as odd upon closer inspection. First, decisions con-
cerning the Union are the outcome of a bargaining process between the dif-
ferent governments of Europe. Each government may believe that its weight
in the negotiations depends on its reputation. Alternatively, one may con-
sider the European Council as a Club were the members obey a social norm
because they believe that the others are obeying it. A question then arises:
why is reputation founded on a criteria of budget balance, and not on a cri-
teria of low unemployment or high GDP growth? There is no good answer
to this question. Probably, similarly to private behaviour, history matters.
The transition towards the EMU has been dominated by the so-called Maas-
tricht criteria2, and among them especially the budget deficit and debt to
GDP ratios. We should recall that the restrictions were accepted even by
2Among the criteria, only one (inflation) was related to a final objective; the others,
exchange rate, long term interest rate, deficit and debt, where aimed at intermediate
objectives.
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governments which were doctrinally opposed to the design of the criteria.
Many countries have had a hard time conforming to them, and when they
have succeeded, the only visible benefit was the increased reputation of their
governments.
In light of these considerations, the enlargement to take place in 2004
is, of course, a major source of concern. With the increase of heterogeneity,
the need of stabilization policies to cushion asymmetric shocks will plausi-
bly increase, and hence the cost of obeying a norm that prevents their full
deployment.
We believe that the Stability Pact is not the only instance of a social norm
constraining public behaviour in recent European history. In the 1990s, the
obedience to the theoretically dubious requirement of maintaining exchange
rate parities vis-a`-vis the German Mark had most of the features of a social
norm. It led to a strongly procyclical monetary policy, similar in many re-
spects to the widely studied (Clarke, 1967) British experience of the 1920s.
As a result, Europe entered a period of slow growth and mounting unem-
ployment that lasted almost six years.
The main conclusion of the model we develop in this paper is that gov-
ernments caring about reputation may not act in the ‘economically’ welfare
maximizing way; the existence of a social norm may hence result in lower
level of income for the area as a whole. Furthermore, enlargement might
worsen the loss linked to obedience of the norm.
The paper is structured as follows: The next section will describe the
provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. The following one (3 will de-
scribe the theoretical arguments underlying the Pact, and argue in favour
of their inconclusiveness. Then, sections 4 and 5 will present our model in
which obedience to the norm is induced by reputation considerations, and
show the eﬀects of enlargement when a norm like the Pact is in place. Section
6 concludes and suggests themes for further research. Finally, an appendix
provides the analytical results.
2 The Stability and Growth Pact
The institutions of Europe, in their actual configuration, stem from two main
sources. The first is the “founding Treaty” signed in Maastricht in 1991, and
the second is the Amsterdam Treaty, of 1997, that completes the setup with
the Stability and Growth Pact3 signed by the countries participating to the
3The full text of the treaties can be found on the Commission’s website:
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/index.html
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European Monetary Union (EMU).
The Maastricht Treaty does set the objective of the Union in very general
terms:
“The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a com-
mon market and an economic and monetary union and by imple-
menting the common policies, (...) to promote throughout the
Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic
activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the
environment, a high degree of convergence of economic perfor-
mance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the
raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic
and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States” (Art.
2)
Yet, after this broad statement the ranking between inflation and growth
is established, by stating that the Community should conduct
“a single monetary policy and exchange rate policy the pri-
mary objective of both of which shall be to maintain price stabil-
ity and, without prejudice to this objective, to support the gen-
eral economic policies in the Community” (Art. 3A, emphasis
added)4.
The Treaty further defines the famous “Maastricht convergence criteria”
that countries had to fulfil in order to be enclosed in the single currency area.
In particular, it requires a 3% deficit to GDP ratio, and a public debt close
to 60%. This latter requirement was overlooked for countries like Italy and
Belgium.
The Amsterdam Treaty (“Stability and Growth Pact”) contains further
provisions regarding fiscal policy, that have the scope of increasing trans-
parency and control on public finances: Each year, member countries have
to present a ”Stability and Convergence Program”, embedding the following
information:
• A medium-term objective for the budgetary position of close to balance
or in surplus, the adjustment path and the expected path of the general
government debt ratio
4Notice that the price stability and growth objectives have instead equal dignity in the
US FED statute, as designed by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the Employment Act of
1946, and the Full Employment and Balanced Growth (Humphrey-Hawkins) Act of 1978.
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• The main assumptions about expected economic developments (growth,
employment, inflation and other important economic variables)
• A description of budgetary and other economic policy measures being
taken and/or proposed to achieve the objectives of the program
• An analysis of how changes in the main economic assumptions would
aﬀect the budgetary and debt position
The plans are examined by the European Council, that may subsequently
emit ‘recommendations’, in case the country deviates from the objectives
stated in the program. The two treaties further establish, in the ’ ‘Excessive
deficit procedure’, what deviations from the 3% budget deficit target are
acceptable (strong recessions or exceptional external shocks), and gives the
Council the right to sanction the country not respecting the limit5. It is
important to notice that the sanction is not automatic, but has to be decided
by a qualified majority (two thirds) of the council members.
The Stability Pact constrains national fiscal policies to a (not better de-
fined) medium run close-to-balanced budget. Since 1999, each year, most
Stability Plans forecasted a balanced budget four years later. In March 2002,
in Barcelona, national governments and the Commission have finally agreed
for the medium run to be the year 20046; and the following Seville summit
(June 2002) has quantified the ”close to” statement to be a 0.5% deficit-to-
GDP ratio. Late in September 2002, faced with the persistent slowdown in
economic growth (especially in France, Germany and Italy), the Commission
has extended the ‘deadline’ to 2006 amid protests by the small and virtuous
countries.
3 The Theoretical Debate
The main theoretical foundation of the Stability Pact is an externality argu-
ment: A state running a budget deficit has to borrow; in a monetary union
5http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l25020.htm. The excessive deficit proce-
dure has been first invoked for Portugal (September 2002) for its 2001 deficit. At the
moment (November 2002), a formal procedure has been put in place by the Commission
for Germany, and an early warning has been issued to France; both based on forecated
2002 deficits.
6”Member States will maintain or respect the medium term bud-
getary objective of close to balance or in surplus by 2004 at the latest”
http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/ec/69871.pdf, p. 4. All the European Council’s con-
clusions can be found at http://www.europa.eu.int/council/oﬀ/conclu/index.htm
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this is supposed to raise the common interest rate, and to have restrictive ef-
fects both on public expenditure (the area-wide increased interest payments
reduce government consumption and investment possibilities), and on private
consumption and investment in the other countries. This negative externality
would induce national governments to run excessive budget deficits, allowing
them to make the other countries pay part of ‘the bill’.
The first objection to this argument is purely quantitative, considering
that a one percent increase in the national fiscal deficit would imply a one
or two tenths of percent increase at an European level. Barely significant,
and unlikely to cause a change in the interest rate. More importantly, from a
theoretical viewpoint, the externality argument can be reversed: Suppose a
budget deficit expansion occurred in one country. If this were unwarranted,
it would result in inflationary pressure, and hence in reduced competitivity.
On the other hand, if the deficit responded to a slump in production it would
sustain demand and hence income and imports. In both cases, demand for
the other countries’ production would increase, and their deficit (thanks to
increased fiscal revenues) would be reduced7. Models with either negative
or positive fiscal policy spillovers have flourished in the recent literature;8
but nothing, from a theoretical point of view, may induce to think that
the negative externality would be larger in size than the positive one. Indeed
simple reasoning leads to believe the contrary: generally, a fiscal expansion in
a region does not have negative eﬀects on other regions of the same country.
Given the short life of the EMU, we’ll have to wait some more time for
empirical work to help shed some light on this debate.
A second argument in favour of the Stability Pact is credibility: Exces-
sive deficits may end up in insolvency, forcing the Central Bank to intervene
(against its own statute) to bail out the country involved; otherwise, banks
owning the debt would see their financial soundness hampered, and face the
risk of depositors’ runs. The moral hazard aspect of excessive deficits could
7The conventional wisdom usually contrasts the trade eﬀect (typical of the Mundell-
Fleming model) with opposite eﬀects through exchange and interest rates, that may even
oﬀset the positive influence of imports (Fitoussi and Phelps, 1988). But these arguments
do not apply to a monetary union, with irrevocably fixed exchange rates and common
interest rates.
8Examples of papers with negative spillovers are Andersen and Sorensen (1995), Jensen
(1996), and Catenaro and Tirelli (2000). Some of these papers rely on the adverse eﬀect
of interest rate increases, as described in the text, while others focus on negative terms of
trade eﬀects. The classic book by Mundell (1968) assumed positive demand spillovers, that
also appeared in recent papers as the ones by Dixon and Santorini (1997), and Beetsma
Debrun and Klaassen (2001). Levine and Brociner (1994) have a model in which all these
externalities play a role, and argue that the negative ones probably dominate the positive
ones.
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hence undermine the Central Bank credibility in its commitment to fight
inflation. Furthermore, as the costs of an ECB bailout would be sustained
by all EMU citizens, this would encourage irresponsible behaviour of govern-
ments. A constraint on deficits can avoid this risk.
This argument may be dismissed on several grounds. The first is the
scarce plausibility of a debt crisis in the present context. Since 1945, even in
far more turbulent times, European countries never seriously risked default on
their debt. Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) further notice that contrary to
Mexico and East Asia during the crises of the 1990s, the European banking
system exposure, and the term structure of public debts seem more solid,
so that the bailout risk is not particularly relevant. And at any rate, they
argue that such a risk would be better dealt with by improving public debt
management and bank regulation.
As for credibility, it is far from obvious that it would be enhanced. The
Pact was designed assuming that governments would accumulate surpluses in
good times to allow the operation of automatic stabilizers in bad times9. This
ideal scenario though, did not take into account at least two complications:
The first, correctly predicted by Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998), is that this
symmetry would only be attained after a long transition; during this transi-
tion, still happening, governments are being forced to restrictive fiscal policies
irrespective of the business cycle phase. To make things worse, the Pact was
signed at the end of a long phase of convergence to the Maastricht criteria,
that involved procyclical fiscal policies during at least the years 1995-97. This
in turn provoked, in the attempt to restore ‘normal’ levels of taxation and ex-
penditure, expansionary policies when growth later resumed in Europe. For
all these reasons the Euro area economy has experienced, especially since the
end of the US expansion of the 1990s, an explosive combination of depressed
growth and (procyclical) restrictive fiscal policy induced by the convergence
to Maastricht first, and by the Stability Pact after. Mainly because of high
interest charges , the three largest countries, Germany France and Italy do
not have room for the automatic stabilizers to play, so that fiscal policy
is ineﬀective even facing transitory shocks. This situation being simply un-
bearable, it is already resulting in ”creative accounting” experiments, and in
increasing pressure to revise or soften the Pact. Even worse, the impossibility
to use the fiscal instrument is inducing governments and economists to put
pressure on the ECB for a more expansionary monetary stance, undermin-
ing the support for the fight against inflation. These phenomena seem far
9Nevertheless, “the problem, with the Pact as presently framed is that it is all stick
and no carrot; rewarding good fiscal behaviour in booms rather than, or in addition to,
punishing bad behaviour in slumps, would certainly make better sense” (Bean, 1998,
p.106).
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more threatening, for the credibility of the European institutional system as
a whole, than the bailout risk.
Another popular argument in favour of the Pact builds on the literature
that flourished in the 1990s on the Non-Keynesian eﬀects of budget deficit
reductions (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990, 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1997;
Perotti, 1999). Broadly speaking, the argument goes as follows: If the budget
deficit reduction is credible and significant, it may trigger the expectation of
a permanently lower share of government spending in GDP. The consequent
upwards revision of permanent income, will cause private consumption and
investment increases, and hence be expansionary. This will in turn reinforce
the initial debt consolidation. Again, the argument is not convincing. First,
the literature cited above finds that empirically this eﬀect has had more
chances to overcome the standard Keynesian deflationary eﬀect when public
finances are in distress, and when fiscal consolidation is seen as credible and
based on expenditure reduction rather than tax increases. Now, the situation
of European countries’ public finances hardly qualifies as unsustainable or
explosive. The argument might serve as a basis for a Maastricht-type limit,
but certainly not for a balanced budget as required by the Stability Pact.
Furthermore, as we said earlier, especially in periods of low growth the Pact
will have the perverse eﬀect to induce governments to find loopholes and
shortcuts to meet the requirements, actions that will hardly have a positive
eﬀect on private expectations. Finally, we may notice that the arguments in
favour of expansionary eﬀects of fiscal contractions suggest its una tantum
nature. Advocating these eﬀects to justify a long term rule does not seem
appropriate10.
Finally a popular argument in favour of the Pact maintains that excessive
budget deficits are inherently unfair because they shift to future generations
the burden of current expenditure. This interegenerational fairness argument
is important and legitimate. We believe nevertheless that it should be appro-
priately developed, by fully considering costs and benefits of current deficit
for future generations. Nobody would deny that besides investment, many
current expenditures actually benefit future generation (think for instance
of well functioning educational and health systems). A serious analysis of
the intergenerational eﬀects of public deficits should take those benefits into
account as well, and the fact that they are hard to measure is no excuse for
excluding them, and considering the costs alone.
On a completely diﬀerent key, Eichengreen andWyplosz (1998) argue that
assuming that governments have a political capital to spend in unpopular
10We thank Robert Solow for suggesting this argument.
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measures, the Pact forced them to spend this capital on fiscal consolidation,
rather than on more needed measures like labour market or pension reforms.
To summarize our argument so far, the theoretical foundations of the
Stability Pact are not as solid as the proponents of a zero deficit rule claim.
There is no consensus in the theoretical literature, and if a tendency has to be
found, it is towards a critical attitude, with attacks coming from the right as
well as from the left. In fact, it is our opinion that the major element behind
the observance of the Pact by European countries is at present their fear of
a public reprimand by the other members of the “club”. In a situation in
which most countries suﬀer from low growth, and lack of policy instruments,
the observance of strict and often procyclical fiscal discipline can only be
explained by the fear of reputational eﬀects.
In the next section we present a simple model derived from Akerlof (1980),
in which we show that an ineﬃcient equilibrium caused by a social norm can
be sustained, if deviation from the norm causes a loss of reputation.
4 The Model
This section introduces a static, very stylized model of public choice and
reputation. In general terms, the government’s objective function has two
arguments, welfare of the population, and reputation among its peers. This
general setting may be applied to various problems; in this paper we assume
that the welfare measure is the output gap11, whereas reputation stems from
obeying the Stability Pact, and giving up income stabilization. Consistently
with our discussion of the previous section, we assume that positive and
negative externalities linked to budget deficits wash out, so that they do not
play a role in the model. Our formalization rules out any deficit bias, as
governments do not try to push output above its natural level; this has the
important implication that no conflict with the Central Bank arises, and we
can avoid modeling monetary policy.
Suppose we have an economic union of unit mass. Each country belonging
to the union (indexed by i) is very broadly described by an aggregate demand
relationship, and by a stochastic process describing private demand:
yi = ci + gi
(1)
ci = y¯ + εi
11By targeting the output gap, on one side the government reduces variability of income,
therefore reducing uncertainty for its citizens; on the other, it sustains employment and
per capita income, both linked to individual welfare.
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In words, total income in country i is simply the sum of private (ci) and public
(gi) expenditure, that for sake of simplicity can be viewed as deficit spending.
The natural or potential level of income (y¯) is given by the deterministic part
of private consumption, and it is assumed to be equal across countries. We
assume that the shock has a uniform distribution with zero mean: εi ∼
U(−a, a).12
The government objective is to set gi in order to minimize deviations
from natural income (the output gap). We assume that it knows the gap,
and that it can immediately act in response to it. In this sense we can think
of gi as modelling the eﬀect of automatic stabilizers, rather than sluggish
discretionary policy (see Solow 2002). Furthermore, assume that a social
norm is in place, call it ‘Stability Pact’. This norm stems from a political
process, and has no clear economic justification; it considers values of gi
diﬀerent from zero as ’bad’. Each government knows that, by breaking the
norm, it will gain the undesired reputation of a ‘naughty boy’. The objective
function is a loss minimization
min
gi
Li = α (yi − y¯)2 + diRi (2)
Notice that this function rules out any deficit bias. Ri is the loss linked to
a bad reputation, and di is a dummy variable taking value of 1 if the social
norm is broken and 0 if it is not.
The norm has another arbitrary (and theoretically ungrounded) charac-
teristic, namely that positive values of gi are seen as worse than negative
ones. Furthermore assume that the loss of reputation is proportional to the
fraction of governments that believe in the code, µ, and that it does not
depend on the magnitude of gi.



Ri = β
2
+µ if gi < 0
Ri = β
2
−µ if gi > 0
(3)
where 0 < β+ < β− models the lower weight given by the social norm to
positive deviations with respect to negative ones
The government faces a two step problem: (a) decide whether to break
the code and stabilize (gi 6= 0⇒ di = 1); and (b) if the code is broken, what
level of gi to choose. The problem can be tackled backwards, remembering
that if the code is broken the reputation loss is not linked to the size of
12For this particular distribution, f(ε) = 1/2a, F (ε) = (ε+ a)/2a, and V ar(ε) = a2/3.
Notice that this assumption about the shocks rules out correlation between income in the
countries.
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stabilization. Substituting equations (1) within equation (2), we obtain
min
gi
α (gi + εi)
2 + diRi (4)
whose solution is
gi = −εi ⇒ yi = y¯ (5)
If the government does let automatic stabilizers play, it succeeds in compen-
sating private consumption deviations, and income is always at its natural
level. This implies that regarding the choice of whether to stabilize, the loss
in the two cases (S/F, stabilize/follow the norm) will be



LSi = Ri = β
2
jµ j = +,−
LFi = αε
2
i
(6)
The norm will be followed only if LFi < L
S
i , i.e. if
|εi| ≤ ε¯j = βj
r
µ
α
j = +,− (7)
So, the higher the reputation loss (high βj), and the lower the weight given
to the output gap (low α), the higher the threshold ε¯j, i.e. the deviation
the government will allow without stabilizing. Notice that the asymmetry in
reputation loss (β+ < β−) results in a higher threshold for negative shocks
(ε¯+ < ε¯−); in other words, the rule will be more easily broken if shocks are
positive.
Short term equilibrium
In the short term the fraction of believers of the norm µ is given. Remember
that the shock has a uniform distribution. This means that the fraction of
governments following the norm, i.e. those for which the shock is low enough,
is
x =
β+ + β−
2a
r
µ
α
(8)
Long term equilibria
In the long run, the number of believers in the norm changes according to
their number with respect to the followers.
µ˙ = ϕ(x− µ) ϕ > 0 (9)
where ϕ is a positive multiplicative constant. So, if more governments be-
lieve in the norm, than follow it, the number of believers will decrease; and
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if the opposite holds, the number will increase. The following proposition
characterizes the long run, or steady state equilibrium (µ˙ = 0):
Proposition 1 Suppose βj > 0, (j = +,−); then
(a) Two equilibria may exist, one in which nobody follows the rule, and one
in which a positive fraction 0 < µ∗∗ ≤ 1 of governments follows the rule:
µ∗ = 0
(10)
µ∗∗ = min
Ã
1,
¡
β− + β+
¢2
4a2α
!
(b) The equilibrium µ∗ is unstable, whereas the equilibrium µ∗∗ is globally
stable
Proof. See Appendix
One of the two equilibria (µ∗) corresponds to the equilibrium without
reputation (nobody believes in the norm, nobody follows it and nobody is
sanctioned for that). The other instead has a positive fraction of governments
following the rule and hence not stabilizing13. µ is inversely related to α
and a: Both a higher weight given to stabilization, and a more unstable
macroeconomic environment, make the rule less sustainable. In particular the
role of the latter parameter may be worth investigation in further research.
Notice that if the sanctions are weak enough (0 <
¡
β− + β+
¢2
< 4a2α ⇒
µ∗∗ < 1) there is coexistence, in steady state, of governments stabilizing and
governments following the rule.
Substituting back in equation 7, we obtain the following long term value
for the threshold:
ε¯j = βj
β− + β+
2aα
j = +,− (11)
The next paragraph will analyze the properties of the two equilibria with or
without the social norm.
Aggregate income and welfare
In the first equilibrium, µ∗ = 0 we have the same (optimal) level of income.
Every government stabilizes, and aggregate income is Y ∗ = y¯ (the Union has
unit mass). Accordingly, aggregate loss L∗ = 0, as the value of Ri is equal
13Having only one stable equilibrium, with positive µ, we don’t deal, with the emergence
of the rule, nor with its robustness with respect to parameter changes (µ∗∗ is the only stable
equilibrium). We are only concerned by the welfare eﬀects of the norm.
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to zero for every i. The equilibrium with a positive fraction of governments
following the rule will on the other hand be characterized by lower aggregate
income and higher aggregate loss. The following proposition states the result:
Proposition 2 Suppose β+ < β−. Then
(a) The µ∗∗ equilibrium, with a positive number of followers of the norm, is
characterized by a lower level of production:
Y ∗ = y¯ > Y ∗∗ = y¯ −
¡
β+ + β−
¢2
16a3α2
¡
β2− − β2+
¢
(b) The equilibrium with positive µ is inferior: L∗ = 0 < L∗∗. This holds for
any positive value of at least one βj (j = −,+).
Proof. See appendix
In this section we proved in the general case that the emergence of a social
norm whose violation involves a reputational loss may yield two equilibria,
one in which the norm is neglected, and the other in which it is followed by
a positive fraction of agents. We further showed that the latter equilibrium
is globally stable, and that it involves a lower aggregate welfare. Further
assuming that negative deviations are sanctioned more than positive ones,
we were able to show that average income is lower in the equilibrium with
the norm. Before tackling, in the next section, the issue of enlargement,
we’ll make some simplifying assumptions aimed at keeping the algebra of the
model tractable. We’ll assume that there is no penalty for positive deviations
from the rule (only deficits and positive g add to bad reputation): β+ = ε¯+ =
0, β− = β > 0. Furthermore, we’ll normalize the shock to a =
1
2
, and the
weight to α = 1. As a consequence,
µ∗∗ = min
µ
1
2
, β2
¶
L∗∗ = β4
µ
1
2
− 2β
2
3
¶
ε¯− = ε¯ = β
2 Y ∗∗ = y¯ − β
4
2
where ε¯, Y ∗∗, L∗∗ are all calculated in the case β2 < 1
2
.14 Notice that
as the countries subject to positive shocks are not sanctioned, they will not
follow the norm, and consequently µ (and ε¯) will never be larger than 1
2
(corresponding to the case in which no country hit by a negative shock stabi-
lizes). Furthermore, from now on we’ll focus on the only stable equilibrium,
namely the (ineﬃcient) one with µ = µ∗∗.
14If µ∗∗ = 1
2
,then ε¯ = a = 1
2
, L∗∗ = 1
12
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5 Enlarging the Club: New Members and
Reputation
In this section we explore the behaviour of our model in the case of an enlarge-
ment of the Union. To do so, we introduce heterogeneity in a very peculiar
way: We assume that for exogenous reasons (for example past history) not all
countries suﬀer from the same reputational loss in case they break the code.
To keep things simple, they are divided in two groups, (b)ad and (g)ood, of
mass ν and 1−ν respectively. We further assume that countries belonging to
the two groups face the same shocks, have the same average income, and the
same weight for output stabilization. The only diﬀerence is that reputation
loss is larger for ‘bad’ countries (βg < βb). For each group we can compute
the threshold and the fraction of followers (see eqs. 7 and 8, remembering
that here a = 1/2, α = 1) :
ε¯k = βk
√
µ k = b, g
(12)
xk = βk
√
µ
The total number of followers is then
x = νxb + (1− ν)xg = (νβb + (1− ν)βg)
√
µ (13)
The steady state equation and its nonzero solution (eqs. 9 and 10)
(νβb + (1− ν)βg)
√
µ− µ = 0
(14)
µ = (νβb + (1− ν)βg)2 ≡ β2
Accordingly, the values for the thresholds are
ε¯k = βkβ = βk(νβb + (1− ν)βg) (15)
where βg < βb ⇒ ε¯g < ε¯b. Average income for the area can be written as
y∗∗ =
Z y¯−ε¯b
y¯− 1
2
y¯ dy| {z }
A
+
Z y¯+ 1
2
y¯
y¯ dy| {z }
B
+
Z y¯
y¯−ε¯g
y dy| {z }
C
+
Z y¯−ε¯g
y¯−ε¯b
(νy + (1− ν)y¯) dy| {z }
D
(16)
whith the integrals A and B collecting the countries that do stabilize, either
because they are hit a positive shock, or because (the absolute value of) the
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negative shock is above all the thresholds. C represents countries whose shock
is so small that they do not stabilize whatever their group is. Finally, integral
D represents the interval of countries for which the behaviour depend on the
group. If they are ‘bad’ (ν of them), they do not stabilize, whereas if they
are ‘good’, they will find it convenient to stabilize. Equation 16 yields
y∗∗ = y¯ − 1
2
(νε¯2b + (1− ν)ε¯2g) (17)
that is the equivalent of equation (23).
Notice that, as less countries will stabilize, average income in the ‘b’ group
will be lower than in the ‘g’ group:
y∗∗b = y¯ −
1
2
ε2b < y¯ −
1
2
ε2g = y
∗∗
g (18)
Hence, even assuming that the natural level of income is the same, the mere
existence of the norm might generate income inequality.
Newly admitted members are usually closely scrutinized to verify whether
they abide to the rules. The ten countries that should join the European
Union starting 2004 will be no exception, and though not formally, their
public finances will most probably be subject to stricter controls from the
old member states. Even more plausibly, the newcomers themselves will do
whatever in their possibilities to show the other participants of the club that
they deserve to be part of it. In terms of our model, this means that the ratio
of governments for which deviations from the norm imply a higher reputation
loss will increase. The following proposition relates average income, and its
variability, with the ratio of bad governments on the total:
Proposition 3 Assume that 0 < βg < βb. Then, as the ratio of ‘bad’ gov-
ernments ν increases:
(a) Average income for the area as a whole decreases.
(b) Income variability for the area as a whole increases.
Proof. See appendix
The model gives thus an insight on the possible eﬀects of enlargement
in presence of a constraining rule on stabilization policies. If the intuitive
assumption that entrants will have to be more rigorous than the old members
of the Union proves correct, then the norm will become more binding, with
the eﬀect of increasing income variability, and reducing average income and
welfare of the area. We believe that such a risk should be taken into account
when discussing the future institutional setup of the EMU, and especially
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when coming to the issue of ‘deepening vs. enlarging’ the Union. Notice
furthermore that this result is derived in the most unfavorable case, given
that besides reputation countries are all alike; the negative eﬀects of the norm
would be even more evident if we had allowed for heterogeneity.
6 Conclusion: Enlargement and the Pact
This paper developed the consequences of a strong but plausible premise,
namely that the Stability and Growth Pact has uncertain theoretical justifi-
cations, and that its raison d’eˆtre is mainly a reputational issue. In this sense
it may be considered a social norm of the type analyzed in the seminal pa-
per by Akerlof (1980). The model we presented in the previous sections was
willingly kept abstract and simple, in particular assuming that the system,
as described by equations 1, was static; and more importantly that positive
and negative externalities washed out. At the price of more cumbersome
algebra, we could express the model in terms of growth rates, keeping the
main conclusions unaltered:
a. In spite of its lack of economic justification, the norm generates a stable
equilibrium with lower growth and welfare. Furthermore, the higher the
weight attached to reputational loss, the lower the growth rate.
b. Further making the realistic assumption that in case they broke the
Pact, new members would suﬀer a higher loss in reputation than the
others, we showed that the enlargement would further decrease the area
wide average growth rate, and increase income dispersion.
A few extensions might add to the insights of model. Some would intu-
itively strengthen our results, for example if the model was complicated in
order to keep track of long term variations in potential income. If we consider
that, especially in periods of fast technological change, potential output is
plausibly aﬀected (via investment) by protracted periods of low growth, the
dynamics would probably result in even stronger long run negative eﬀects
of a social norm depressing output in the short run. Another extension
that would highlight the negative eﬀects of the Pact is the consideration
of common (instead of independent) shocks. If business cycles are synchro-
nized, then the number of countries breaking the code would be higher in
recession times (something we are observing nowadays). The eﬀect of this
extension on the norm itself (could it be that if a common shock is severe
enough the norm simply breaks down?) would be particularly interesting to
study. On the other hand, the explicit consideration of negative externalities
17
of budget deficits would soften our conclusion; showing how do externalities
interact with the reputational issue tackled in this paper would certainly be
interesting.
Another topic for future research is the introduction of size eﬀects, that
may aﬀect both the sanctioning scheme, and the influence of deficits on
reputation.
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Appendix: Proof of Propositions
Proof. Proposition 1
(a)
Equation (9), together with the steady state condition µ˙ = 0 implies
xF = µ, i.e. (using eq. 8)
µ =
β+ + β−
2a
r
µ
α
(19)
the two solutions are given in equation (10), and repeated here for conve-
nience:
µ∗ = 0
µ∗∗ = min
Ã
1,
¡
β− + β+
¢2
4a2α
!
where the formulation for µ∗∗ stems from the fact that µ ∈ [0, 1].
(b)
For notational convenience, define K =
β++β−
2a
√
α , implying that µ
∗∗ = K2.
In order to study stability, we substitute (8) inside (9), to obtain the follow-
ing:
µ˙ = F (µ) = ϕ(K
√
µ− µ) (20)
Notice that F (0) = F (µ∗∗) = 0. Furthermore, notice that
lim
µ→0
F 0(µ) = lim
µ→0
1
2
√
µ
− 1 > 0
so that the µ∗ = 0 equilibrium in unstable. Global stability of µ∗∗ requires
F (µ) > 0 ∀µ < µ∗∗ = K2, and F (µ) < 0 ∀µ > µ∗∗ = K2, exactly what we
have (remember that ϕ > 0):
K
√
µ− µ > 0⇐⇒ µ < K2 = µ∗∗
(21)
K
√
µ− µ < 0⇐⇒ µ > K2 = µ∗∗
so that µ∗∗ is globally stable.
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Proof. Proposition 2
(a)
If εi ∼ U(−a, a),it follows that yi = y¯ + εi ∼ U(y¯ − a, y¯ + a). Aggregate
(and average) income of the area, wen µ = µ∗∗, can then be written as
Y ∗∗ =
1
2a


Z y¯−ε¯−
y¯−a
y¯dy| {z }
A
+
Z y¯+a
y¯+ε¯+
y¯dy| {z }
B
+
Z y¯+ε¯+
y¯−ε¯−
ydy| {z }
C

 (22)
where A and B denote the ”extreme” countries, whose shock is large, and
who consequently stabilize (yi = y¯); whereas C is the income of countries
which do not stabilize, and consequently produce yi = y¯+ εi. Changing from
yi to εi, and collecting the y¯ term, equation 22 can be rewritten as
Y ∗∗ =
1
2a
µ
y¯
Z a
−a
dε+
Z ε¯+
−ε¯−
ε dε
¶
=
= y¯ +
1
4a
(ε¯2+ − ε¯2−) (23)
= y¯ +
¡
β+ + β−
¢2
16a3α2
¡
β2+ − β2−
¢
< Ny¯
being β+ < β− by assumption
(b)
Governments stabilizing will face a reputation loss of β2jµ, with j being
diﬀerent according to the sign of the shock. Countries following the rule will
suﬀer a loss of αε2i . Aggregate loss can be written as
L∗∗ =
1
2a
µZ −ε¯−
−a
µ∗∗β2− dε+
Z a
ε¯+
µ∗∗β2+ dε+
Z ε¯+
−ε¯−
αε2 dε
¶
(24)
=
µ∗∗
2a
¡
(a− ε¯−)β2− + (a− ε¯+)β2+
¢
+
α
6a
(ε¯3+ + ε¯
3
−)
whose terms are all positive. As a consequence,
L∗∗ > L∗ = 0
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Proof. Proposition 3
First of all notice that
βb > βg ⇒ ε¯b > ε¯g
i.e. that the threshold value is diﬀerent for countries belonging to the two
groups
(a)
Recall that average income is (from equation 17)
y∗∗ = y¯ − 1
2
(νε¯2b + (1− ν)ε¯2g) (25)
whose derivative is
∂y∗∗
∂ν
= −1
2
·
ε¯2b − ε¯2g + 2νb
µ
ε¯b
∂ε¯b
∂ν
− ε¯g
∂ε¯g
∂ν
¶¸
< 0
∂ε¯b
∂ν
=
∂ε¯b
∂β
∂β
∂ν
=
βb
α
(βb − βg) >
∂ε¯g
∂ν
=
βg
α
(βb − βg) by the assumption
βb−βg > 0 that guarantees that the term within square brackets is positive.
(b)
The variance of income can be written, similarly to the mean, as
V (y) =
Z y¯−ε¯b
y¯− 1
2
(y¯ − y∗∗)2dy +
Z y¯+ 1
2
y¯
(y¯ − y∗∗)2dy +
Z y¯
y¯−ε¯g
(y − y∗∗)2dy +
(26)
+
Z y¯−ε¯g
y¯−ε¯b
(νy + (1− ν)y¯ − y∗∗)2 dy
Tedious algebra, and substitution of y∗∗ with the value from equation
(17), yields
V (y) = ν2ε¯3b(
1
3
− 1
4
ε¯b) + (1− ν)2ε¯3g(
1
3
− 1
4
ε¯g) + 2ν(1− ν)ε¯2g(
1
3
ε¯g −
1
4
ε¯2b)
(27)
= ν2V (yb) + (1− ν)2V (yg) + 2ν(1− ν)[E(ybyg)−E(yb)E(yg)]
We want to show that
dV (y)
dν
=
∂V (y)
∂ν
+
∂V (y)
∂ε¯b
∂ε¯b
∂ν
+
∂V (y)
∂ε¯g
∂ε¯g
∂ν
> 0 (28)
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i.e. that an increase in the proportion of bad countries brings about increased
variability area-wide. Analytically this derivative is impossible to sign, so
that we used a numerical procedure15. We made 1000 random draws of
the parameters βb ∈ (0, 1), βg < βb, ν ∈ (0, 1), controlling that they were
compatible with values of ε¯b ≤ 1/2. We then computed dV (y)dν , and were able
to show that it is always greater than 0, as the proposition states. Figure 1
shows the result (only 500 points are shown to enhance clarity).
Figure 1: Values of dV (y)dν for diﬀerent values of ε¯g and ε¯b. Each circle repre-
sents a random draw of βb ∈ (0, 1), βg(0, βb), and ν ∈ (0, 1).
15The matlab code is available at http://www.columbia.edu/˜fs87/europe.html
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